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1. Introduction 
 
Under the United States Arms Export Control Act, the International Traffic in Arms Regulations 
(ITAR) control the export of technologies that are specified as defense articles on the United 
States Munitions List (USML).  The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) within the 
Department of State (DoS) interprets and enforces these regulations in an effort to safeguard 
national security by denying advanced military technology to potential competitors. 
  
ITAR is a far-reaching set of regulations that encompasses most areas of technology that have 
potential military value.  To prevent unauthorized export of technology, ITAR requires that 
whenever a defense article or technical data on a defense article is exported, a license must be 
obtained from the DDTC. ITAR defines “export” to include the entire spectrum of technical 
activities, from design, development, and production to operation, repair, and maintenance [1]. 
Currently, all spacecraft are classified as defense items on the USML; therefore, disclosing or 
transferring technical information, assistance, or hardware during any phase of a spacecraft’s 
lifecycle requires a license.   
 
Export control attempts to maintain technical advantage by sheltering defense-critical 
technologies. However, effective export control policies must not only limit technologies’ 
dissemination into the international marketplace but also consider how control-induced 
marketplace distortions hinder the domestic innovation that is necessary to maintain technical 
advantage in the international market. In recent years, officials from both the for-profit and the 
non-profit space communities have reported that the USML’s broad classification of spacecraft 
as munitions has significantly and unnecessarily limited research and commercial activities; the 
undesirable consequences have motivated both communities to issue calls for export control 
reform.  
  
This paper identifies the difficulties that have been faced by each community and provides 
suggestions for future policy changes.  We introduce our discussion by first presenting the 
history of export control in the post-Cold War era.  Next, we define the policy’s main 
stakeholders and provide a focused discussion of the for-profit and non-profit space 
communities’ interests in reform. Finally, we define and analyze a trade space of export control 
regimes and make policy suggestions that will enable ITAR to become more effectively aligned 
with its stakeholders’ interests.  
2. Historic Export Control Regimes & Attempts at Reform  
 
Many reform advocates suggest that spacecraft were more effectively controlled in the past and 
recommend that current export control regulations be reformed to reflect the positive aspects of 
past forms of control. In light of these recommendations, we propose that understanding the 
evolution of export control policy is critical to identifying and evaluating options for reform. 
Furthermore, a review of export control history contextualizes the regulations within their larger 
geo-political and national security environment and motivates our subsequent suggestions and 
evaluation of opportunities for reform. In this section, we review the major epochs of spacecraft-
related export control and discuss the political and national security motivations associated with 
the various epoch shifts.  
 
With respect to spacecraft, export control can be characterized by three distinct epochs: 1976 to 
1992, 1992 to 1999, and 1999 to the present day. The differentiating factor between these epochs 
is the Department responsible for monitoring or controlling the export of spacecraft: this 
responsibility has shifted from the Department of State (DoS) to the Department of Commerce 
(DoC) and back again.  The main responsibility of the DoS in export control policy is to protect 
sensitive U.S. technology from acquisition by foreign countries, whereas the primary task of the 
DoC is to internationally promote U.S. business interests [2].  
 
In this section, we discuss each epoch of export control and focus on the historic events that 
motivated epoch shifts and the degree to which each Department controlled and limited the 
export of spacecraft. A pictorial representation of the history discussed in this section is provided 
in Figure 1.  
2.1 Export Control Epoch 1 (1976-1992) 
ITAR was initiated by the 1976 Arms Export Control Act and implemented by the 1979 Export 
Administration Act. The Arms Export Control Act states that the DoS will regulate the export of 
defense articles through ITAR. As in today’s regime, in this Cold War epoch, spacecraft were 
classified as munitions and their export was tightly controlled by the DoS.  
  
In 1984, President Reagan relaxed the DoS’s control by granting American companies license to 
export communications satellites (COMSATS) to France for launch on European rockets [3]. 
Regan further relaxed the control of COMSATS when he signed an agreement with China that 
allowed U.S. companies to launch COMSATs on Chinese vehicles [3, 4]. Presidential support 
for reduced export control of commercial satellites continued in the Bush administration: in 
1990, President Bush ordered dual-use items to be removed from the USML, unless their 
technology or hardware threatened national security [4]. The DoC defines dual-use items as 
those which can be used for peaceful scientific and technological purposes and which can also 
potentially serve as defense articles; all dual-use items require a license for export under the 
Export Administration Regulation (EAR) [5].  
 
In response to Bush’s request, the DoS and DoC evaluated their policies and concluded that a 
subset of COMSAT technologies was better monitored under the DoC. Therefore, in 1992, 
Congress transferred those items from the DoS’s USML to the DoC’s broadly-applicable 
Commerce Control List (CCL) [3, 4]. While the CCL controls a wide variety of technology, the 
EAR requires less effort to legally export a dual-use item and does not impose the severe liability 
that exists under ITAR.  (Shortly thereafter, in Epoch 2, DoS transferred all remaining COMSAT 
components to DoC control when President Clinton requested this action in 1996.) 
2.2 Export Control Epoch 2 (1992-1999) 
The second epoch begins with George H.W. Bush’s request to transfer some COMSAT 
components to the DoC’s jurisdiction, includes the full transfer of COMSATs to the DoC in 
1996, and concludes with the decision to return all spacecraft to the USML under the DoS’s 
control. Two major events during this period motivated the shift from the DoC to the DoS: in 
1995 and 1996, two major U.S satellite providers, Hughes and Space Systems Loral, were 
charged with ITAR violations when they provided technical assistance to the Chinese 
government. Specifically, the companies collaborated with the Chinese government during an 
investigation of Long March rockets that failed to deliver Hughes’ and Loral’s payloads to orbit. 
Although both Hughes and Loral obtained DoC approval for their activities, only COMSATS, 
not launch vehicles, were under the DoC’s jurisdiction, so the Congressional Cox Committee 
determined that the launch failure investigation was a violation of ITAR. As a result of this 
decision, both companies were heavily fined.  Congress took action to tighten export controls on 
spacecraft technology, and the 1999 Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act 
returned COMSATs to the USML [2, 3, 4, 6]. 
2.3 Export Control Epoch 3 (1999- ) 
Since 1999, all spacecraft have remained classified as munitions and are controlled by the DoS 
DDTC. This broad classification of spacecraft as munitions has significantly impacted both the 
for-profit and the non-profit space sectors. While a detailed account of these impacts is presented 
in Sections 4 and 5, an overview of the recent, most impactful reforms is provided here.  
 
The non-profit space community was significantly impacted by the 1999 Department of Defense 
Authorization Bill. Spacecraft-related research activity previously subject to the fundamental 
research exclusion under National Security Directive 189 became subject to ITAR’s strict export 
controls. This reform negatively impacted many actors within the non-profit space sector from 
national research labs to NASA to academic research facilities.  The fundamental research 
exemption still existed, but it became much more difficult to reconcile with research projects [7].  
In 2004, the Department of Commerce Inspector General made a series of recommendations 
regarding the regulation of dual-use items which put further restrictions on access to those items 
by foreign nationals. A consortium of provosts from twelve universities, led by MIT, sent a letter 
to the DoC expressing the negative impacts of these regulations and voicing the academic 
community’s serious concerns with the increased controls [8]. Defining and protecting the 
fundamental research exemption in ITAR continues to be of major concern to many non-profit 
space actors today.  
 
The for-profit space community was significantly impacted by the Strom Thurmond National 
Defense Authorization Act’s return of COMSATs to the USML. Since this re-classification, 
industry advocacy groups continue to lobby law-makers to return COMSATs to DoC control. 
Two of the most recent attempts at reform are the H.R. 2410 The Foreign Relations 
Authorization Act and H.R. 3288 Safeguarding United States Satellite Leadership and Security 
Act. H.R. 2410 would have transferred the authority to remove satellites and related components 
from the USML to the President [9]; this bill passed the House but not the Senate [10]. H.R. 
3288 is similar, but applies to commercial satellites only [11]; this bill was referred to the House 
Foreign Relations Committee in November 2011 and currently awaits action [10].  
 
Although the space communities’ recent attempts at reform have yet to impact ITAR’s 
application to spacecraft, in 2010, the Obama Administration announced a plan to modernize 
the export control regime by replacing its convoluted, multiple-agency structure with a single 
control list, enforcing agency, information technology system, and licensing agency. 
Additionally, in the National Defense Authorization Act of 2010, Congress requested that the 
DoD and DoS undertake a formal assessment of the risks associated with removing certain 
space-related components from the USML [12]. These actions indicate that both Congress and 
the executive branch recognize and the need for export control reform and suggest that the 
current political environment may be particularly favorable to near-future attempts to reform.  
2.3 Historical Synthesis  
Throughout the space age, the control of spacecraft exports has oscillated between epochs of 
high control under the DoS to epochs of reduced control under the DoC. Epoch shifts were 
induced when these extreme forms of export control negatively impacted the interests of the 
national security or the space community. Specifically, under the DoC regulation, U.S. security 
interests were compromised and under DoS regulation, the space community’s activities 
continue to be unnecessarily hindered. 
 
Export control policy has also been affected by two major trends that distinguish the Cold War 
competitive environment from the present day.  First, the national security environment has 
changed from a bipolar strategic balance environment to a multipolar world.   In the early Cold 
War era,  national space programs were tightly coupled with military capability and the strategic 
balance because they translated directly to strategic weapon delivery, missile warning, and 
reconnaissance. Maintaining technology parity eventually cost the Soviets more than they could 
afford.  In the modern era, the national security space sector is only a part of the space 
technology market and national security is threatened by a wide range of actors but not by a peer 
competitor.  Second, the commercial sector has expanded to the present state where space 
services are integrated into the daily lives of both the developed and, increasingly, the 
developing world.  Other nations can produce capabilities in space that far exceed some of those 
the US was trying to protect with late Cold War technology restrictions.  During the Cold War, 
space technology itself was a weapon and needed to be protected from Soviet espionage and 
countermeasures; now space technology is more often capable of dual-use for both commercial 
and military purposes.   
 
This historical experience suggests the need for a more nuanced approach to export control that 
exists between these historical extremes and is capable of balancing both national security and 
space community needs in the context of the evolving global security environment and 
commercial market.  
 
In the next section, we provide a general overview of the stakeholders that are interested in and 
impacted by future attempts at ITAR reform and identify metrics to represent stakeholder values 
that reflect the balancing act that we illustrated through the preceding historical overview.  
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: ITAR Timeline
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3. General Stakeholder Identification and Motivation 
 
In order to examine the interests and impact of ITAR on different stakeholders in the spacecraft 
research, development, manufacture, sale, and data-using markets, we define six stakeholder 
values and represent these values as metrics. The metrics were derived from stakeholder written 
opinions and their stated objectives or goals for attempted or desired reform efforts.  The metrics 
represent observed shortfalls in stakeholder satisfaction and/or requirements for a successful 
export control regime that protects national security while minimizing adverse consequences, 
These metrics, which are used to evaluate the policy reform options presented in Section 6, are 
defined as follows: 
 
Collaboration describes the extent to which employers can build a team from the entire pool of 
available talent, including non-Americans.  In highly collaborative environments, stakeholders 
can hire or partner with non-American individuals or groups; this results in additional 
employment opportunities within the U.S. as well as increased intellectual productivity.  
Involvement of non-U.S. persons in a collaborative project on U.S. soil is still a deemed export 
under the ITAR, thus the present regime restricts non-U.S. person activities within the U.S. just 
as strictly as shipping components to foreign soil. 
 
Market Flexibility is the degree to which stakeholders can access a free market with open 
competition for complete spacecraft, subsystems, components, and launch services.   In a fully 
open market, and produced can sell to any customer without restriction. It includes the ability to 
share costs on large projects between multiple international parties or countries.  
 
Compliance Transparency represents how understandable the export regime is, both in assigning 
jurisdiction to either the DoS or DoC and how clear and easy-to-follow its licensing process 
is.  Reforms that increase Compliance Transparency should produce fewer commodity 
jurisdiction requests.  Commodity jurisdiction requests are requests made by exporters for the 
DoS to determine if a particular technology is subject to ITAR due to ambiguities and confusion 
surrounding the definition of covered technology. Compliance Transparency also reduces the 
tendency for exporters to overprotect technology due to an unnecessary fear of liability for 
accidental violations.   
 
Licensing Efficiency measures the cost for stakeholders to acquire licenses, including fees and 
any lost profits due to waiting on license issuance.  Reforms that increase Licensing Efficiency 
should reduce the amount of time it takes to acquire a license. 
 
National Security refers to technology protection and industrial base capability. Technology 
protection prevents degradation of a technology-enabled U.S. military capability by unauthorized 
disclosure to potential adversaries.  Industrial base capability has long been recognized as vital to 
national security; to retain human and financial capital for developing future spacecraft 
technology, US aerospace firms need to be competitive in the expanding global satellite market.   
 
Policy Transformability describes how easily a policy reform suggestion can be implemented 
through changes to legislation and regulation.  Transformability depends heavily on the amount  
of policy change required for a certain reform suggestion and on whether any influential 
stakeholders would actively oppose it. 
 
As defined above, each of our six metrics is positive: an ideal reform would impact stakeholders 
by increasing the metrics for Collaboration, Market Flexibility, Licensing Efficiency, National 
Security, and Policy Transformability. The stakeholders that are impacted by these measures are 
numerous and varied; Table 1 identifies each of these stakeholders and maps them to their 
primary values as represented by our six metrics.  
 
In the subsequent sections, we focus specifically on the needs of two large groups of 
stakeholders, the For-Profit community and the Non-Profit community, which are of particular 
interest for several reasons. First, these communities represent a large fraction of the current 
lobbyists for export control reform; as discussed in Section 2, both for-profit and non-profit 
advocacy groups have actively vocalized their experiences with ITAR and their suggestions for 
reform. Second, together, these communities’ primary values capture many of the values held by 
other stakeholders; thus, by focusing only on these groups, we are still able to capture other 
stakeholders’ varying perspectives on reform. And finally, we are able to capture two of the 
Government Oversight Bodies’ primary values by retaining the National Security and Policy 
Transformability metrics during our subsequent policy evaluation.   
 
  
Table 1: Stakeholder Breakdown and Policy Metrics  
 
4. For-Profit Stakeholder Analysis 
 
The impact of ITAR on the For-Profit Stakeholder community, which primarily consists of major 
systems integrators and their subcontractors, has been well-documented by independent 
advocacy groups, industry-wide associations, and U.S. government agencies [13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 
18]. These reports generally agree that the For-Profit Stakeholder’s loss of global market-share is 
the most significant deleterious impact that ITAR has had on the For-Profit Stakeholder. The 
U.S. Air Force and Commerce Department’s Defense Industrial Base Assessment reports that 
prior to ITAR’s 1998 implementation, U.S. space manufacturers claimed 63% of the global 
market-share; after 2002, U.S. manufacturers have only been able to capture 42% of the global 
space market [13]. Similarly, in the GEO COMSAT sector, where the U.S. has traditionally been 
the dominant manufacturer, the U.S. claim on the global market-share decreased from over 70% 
in 1995 to less than 30% ten years later; this effect is demonstrated in Figure 2 below [14, 19]. 
The revenue generated by the commercial satellite industry has been similarly affected. 
 
 
Figure 2: Worldwide Share of Satellite Exports [14, 17] 
 
We characterize the For-Profit Stakeholder’s loss of global market share as a symptom of ITAR’s 
negative effect on the stakeholder community and suggest it can be ameliorated by specifically 
addressing the symptom’s root causes. In the subsequent subsections, we present these root 
causes and map them to the reform evaluation metrics that were presented in Section 3. 
4.1. Relationship with International Competitors 
One of the root causes of the For-Profit Stakeholder’s loss of global market share is the inability 
of the For-Profit Stakeholder to effectively compete with increasingly capable international 
firms. Although the intent of ITAR is to protect U.S. technological advantage for national 
security, the Institute for Defense Analysis reports that ITAR’s implementation coincided with a 
surge in European commercial space activity and technical evolution [15]. Importantly, some of 
this evolution was motivated by the constraints imposed by ITAR; for example, ESA has 
sponsored several technology development projects with the intent of eliminating European 
reliance on ITAR-regulated goods [13]. Many European manufacturers have also begun 
advertising satellites that are “ITAR-free” and can attractively spare their customers from the 
headaches of U.S. export control. 
 
As a result of this surge in European commercial space activity, the technical capabilities of 
international firms have evolved and the U.S.’s technical advantage has eroded. By applying a 
blanket regulation to all satellite technologies, ITAR continues to control U.S. technologies even 
when an equivalent capability exists in the international marketplace. In these cases, when 
international customers can obtain equivalent, unregulated goods from non-U.S. manufacturers, 
ITAR often deters prospective customers from purchasing U.S. products. In order to address this 
specific condition, the For-Profit Stakeholder values future attempts at reform that increase their 
Market Flexibility. The negative impact on National Security can be minimized if restrictions are 
lifted solely on technology that is already within the capability of foreign developers.  
Specifically, reforms should recognize the capabilities of international firms and in that context, 
should strive to increase the For-Profit Stakeholder’s ability to effectively participate in the 
increasingly competitive global marketplace.   
4.2 ITAR’s Impact on Competitive Bidding 
Another root cause of the For-Profit Stakeholder’s loss of global market share is ITAR’s adverse 
impact on traditional commercial bidding processes. One particular challenge is the extent to 
which Technical Assistance Agreements (TAA) constrain competitive activities: in order to 
initiate any technical communication, including exchanges for marketing, bidding, or proposal 
purposes, U.S. companies must obtain a TAA from the DoS. This requirement is particularly 
challenging in the commercial satellite industry, where contract initiation activities have 
shortened timelines that often cannot accommodate the DoS’ processing time [14]. According to 
a report by the Space Foundation, U.S. companies attribute this TAA requirement to their 
inability to effectively respond to proposal requests in foreign markets [14]. 
 
Even when U.S. companies are able to compete for foreign contracts, ITAR’s TAA requirement 
often makes U.S. technology appear unattractive in comparison to less-regulated components 
from other countries. For example, foreign companies are often discouraged from purchasing 
U.S. technologies because any subsequent interactions with U.S. manufacturers (such as requests 
for additional information or assistance with repairs) require additional licenses [17]. 
Additionally, delays in acquiring export license approval (both for initial purchase and for 
subsequent interactions) have led international customers to cancel orders with U.S. firms and to 
seek technologies elsewhere [19]. In order to address these conditions, future attempts at reform 
should increase the current export control regime’s Cost Efficiency and Market Flexibility. 
Specifically, the For-Profit Stakeholder is interested in reforms that increase their ability to 
effectively participate in traditional commercial bidding processes and in reforms that improve 
the desirability of their products by reducing unnecessary and undesirable compliance measures. 
4.3 ITAR’s Impact on the Cost of Compliance 
A final root cause of the For-Profit Stakeholder’s loss of global market share is the cost of 
complying with the current export control regime. ITAR places the burden of compliance on the 
exporter and thus levies a cost of compliance that reduces domestic companies’ profits and limits 
their ability to compete for a share of the global market. Specifically, the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies reports that compliance costs U.S. companies approximately $50 million 
per year [19]; these funds are typically spent on hiring export control compliance officers, 
consulting external legal counsel, and training employees on compliance practices. In many 
cases, smaller firms that are unable to afford compliance costs are displaced from international 
competition or from the industry altogether [13, 16]. In order to address these conditions, future 
attempts at reform should increase the current export control regime’s Compliance Transparency 
and Cost Efficiency. Specifically, the For-Profit Stakeholder is interested in reforms that will 
reduce the amount of financial and human resources that they must invest in order to insure 
compliance. 
5. Non-Profit Stakeholder Analysis 
 
Agencies or institutions including universities, federally funded research labs, and governmental 
acquisition and operations agencies define their mission in terms other than profit and 
shareholder value, but they are still subject to export control restrictions that limit their 
communication, collaborations, and workforce.  In this section, we focus on the university sector 
of the Non-Profit stakeholder group; this is a small but vital part of the space community that 
faces unique challenges under ITAR.  Universities are just as dependent on the award of 
contracted work as are commercial entities, and they often face the additional challenge of 
meeting their commitment to providing equal education opportunities for all of their students 
while engaging in projects that require them to interface with vendors of ITAR-restricted 
products.  The fundamental research exemption alleviates some of these challenges, yet its 
ambiguity and conditional nature pose difficulties to universities.   
  
In this section, we discuss the impact of ITAR on the university research community in terms of 
the previously defined stakeholder areas of interest, focusing on Compliance Transparency, Cost 
Efficiency, and Collaboration.  We identify trends and present specific examples to illustrate 
impacts the ITAR has had on universities and by extension their students and faculty and the 
organizations with which they collaborate. 
5.1 Ambiguity in Exemptions - Compliance Transparency 
Universities face many of the same challenges with ITAR compliance as any other stakeholder, 
but their unique focus on fundamental research and commitment to unrestricted research and 
access by foreign nationals causes the university stakeholders to focus on Compliance 
Transparency as a primary desired value.  Much of ITAR is vaguely written and is at times self-
contradicting, and unlike many commercial ventures, university communities do not have the 
infrastructure in place to constantly support ITAR compliance efforts with specialized staff or 
contracted legal services.  As a result, many universities encounter difficulties when it comes to 
Compliance Transparency within ITAR, particularly when it comes to the applicability of the 
fundamental research exemption. 
 
ITAR defines fundamental research as “basic and applied research in science and engineering 
where the resulting information is ordinarily published and shared broadly within the scientific 
community as distinguished from research the results of which are restricted for proprietary 
reasons or specific U.S. Government access and dissemination controls.” There are two cases in 
which university research is not considered fundamental: 
(i)  The University or its researchers accept other restrictions on publication of scientific and 
technical information resulting from the project or activity, or 
(ii)  The research is funded by the U.S. Government and specific access and dissemination 
controls protecting information resulting from the research are applicable [20]. 
 
The distinction between cases that can be defined as fundamental research and those that cannot 
can be ambiguous, particularly with collaborations between universities and other entities. 
Organizations with internal proprietary restrictions and export regulations have to reconcile any 
internal intellectual property regulations with the “fundamental research” requirement of putting 
all information in the public domain.  Any foreign student involvement may also negate the 
exemption of fundamental research and require ITAR licensing even if the project is within the 
public domain [7].  Software, physical goods, and work done without the intent to publish all do 
not count as fundamental research.  License applications are handled on a case-by-case basis, so 
even in organizations with a history of collaborations it can be difficult to confidently determine 
the applicability of ITAR licensing to any one project. 
 
Regardless of its ambiguity, the language of the fundamental research exemption as created 
under President Ronald Reagan in 1985 [21] is the one major protection that university research 
has for open publication and education.  Over the thirteen years since the 1999 addition of 
satellites to the USML, the American Association of Universities (AAU), a coalition of 61 
research universities, has written numerous letters to policymakers requesting clarification and 
reaffirmation of commitment to the fundamental research exemption as various clauses and 
recommendations in Department of Commerce and Department of State publications appear to 
threaten that exemption.  For example, in response to the 2004 recommendations by the 
Department of Commerce, twenty-two research university presidents expressed concern over the 
“proposed narrowing of the definition of ‘fundamental research’ and widening of the definition 
of ‘deemed exports’ when foreign nationals engage in certain research or study” in 
documentation and reviews by multiple Department Inspector Generals [22]   
  
The need for a smoother, more understandable compliance process from the DoD has been 
acknowledged from many sides.  The DoD depends on universities to do a great amount of 
research and development work.  The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology 
and Logistics, John J. Young Jr., released a noteworthy memo in 2008 that urged DoD program 
managers to take on some of the burden of identification by writing solicitations that make the 
inclusion (or not) of restricted work clear and by “regularly monitoring the performance of 
contracts and grants for fundamental research so that appropriate action may be taken if the 
character of the research changes” [23].  Given how crucial this fundamental research exemption 
is for many projects and for the sustainment of research universities, Compliance Transparency 
is the driving metric for this stakeholder. 
5.2 Licensing Efficiency 
In the cases when the fundamental research exemption does not hold, universities must apply for 
and receive export licenses for all technology that falls under ITAR (i.e. all spacecraft and 
associated technology and information).  Increased Licensing Efficiency is highly desired by the 
university stakeholders to save time and costs in what is already a complex regulatory 
environment. 
 
Collaboration between industry and universities is a common occurrence, and establishing ITAR 
control measures can have a significant impact on the scheduling and budget of these 
projects.  Licensing Efficiency has an economic effect resulting from both the cost of compliance 
and the potential loss of projects due to conflicting policies on accepting controlled information. 
For university research communities, there is a further, subtler educational cost attributed to the 
need for licensing any projects that involve satellite technologies contained on the USML.  
 The licensing process is an involved, daunting task, especially for universities and organizations 
that are not accustomed to working with ITAR.  The multiple-step license acquisition process 
can potentially take up to six months, and mistakes and complications in the application would 
only extend that process.  On top of that, working with external collaborators may require 
Technical Assistance Agreements, Manufacturing License Agreements, and Distribution 
Agreements, adding an additional two months to the process [24].  Existing workshops from the 
Department of State and Defense are geared more toward industry, because commercial 
companies tend to submit more license requests, so universities must spend time and money to 
train staff in the ITAR regulation process or bring in outside experts. Fortunately, major research 
universities have deemed their own participation in space research worth the additional cost and 
hassle of complying with ITAR and obtaining licenses, but the process is not an efficient use of 
resources.  The Office of Management and Budget restricts the amount of money that the federal 
government can reimburse universities for compliance costs, and these costs are the fastest-
increasing expenditure in research areas [25]. 
 
Because ITAR’s purpose is to protect national security, there are strict penalties for 
violations.  Criminal sanctions yield a fine of up to $1,000,000 per violation, and civil sanctions 
yield a fine of up to $500,000 per violation.  In addition to the fine, the guilty party may face 
either of or both the denial of export privileges and a seizure or forfeiture of goods [20].  The 
ambiguity and uncertainty of ITAR applicability coupled with the consequences of not adhering 
to proper policy frequently lead organizations to be overly cautious and implement restrictions 
that they may not have needed in the first place.  There is an inherent trade-off between the time 
it would take to determine if a project is actually ITAR-controlled and the restrictions that would 
come with the license.  Universities often work on compressed timescales as compared with 
commercial entities (because research grants are often calendar-driven instead of project 
schedule-driven) and are thus more likely to err on the side of caution. 
 
Academics face the threat of very serious personal liability for ITAR violations that is 
inconsistent with the educational mission of open inquiry, research, and teaching. The fear of 
violating ITAR drives professors in the aerospace field to limit the scope of their lectures to 
avoid accidentally disseminating any controlled information to foreign students [26]. Professors 
sometimes limit their interactions with foreign graduate students, and are restricted outside of the 
classroom on the information they can present at conferences or discuss with outside 
parties.  This has a significant impact on the advancement of U.S. space technology and 
ultimately hurts the capabilities of the research universities [27].   
 
There are a few different ways in which universities choose to deal with ITAR 
compliance.  Many leading research universities like MIT and the University of Maryland have 
published commitments to maintain a policy to keep research open and available to 
all.  Universities like these that make a commitment to “openness of research” may acquire 
licenses to do otherwise restricted work, but they may not have facilities and information on 
campus that restrict access based on nationality [28]. Other universities accept projects with 
ITAR restrictions into specific ITAR-controlled laboratories; for example, the University of 
Michigan has some facilities that are U.S. citizen access-only [29, 30]. These ITAR-controlled 
universities can accept restricted work that universities like MIT and UMD cannot.  A change in 
the ITAR may positively benefit the work that universities like MIT and UMD can accept, but 
universities that have invested in restricted facilities and built their programs around such 
contracts stand to lose much of their work if more universities are able to compete for the 
projects.   
 
Broniatowski et al. explored how many contracts schools like MIT and the University of 
California at Berkeley turn down due to clauses restricting publication or researcher nationalities: 
Due to such clauses, MIT has turned down more than three million dollars in research contracts 
within the past two years. The University of California at Berkeley similarly rejected half a 
million dollars from the Army Corps of Engineers rather than submit to foreign national 
restrictions. However, Broniatowski notes, both MIT and UC-Berkeley spend well over four 
hundred million dollars each year on research, meaning the rejected contracts are less than one 
percent of their total research budgets [31]. 
 
However, this conclusion is somewhat deceptive, since the majority of those declined research 
contracts are in engineering or computer science fields, most of them specific to technology with 
defense applications, meaning that departments like aerospace engineering end up with a 
disproportionately large amount of turned down contracts compared to their total departmental 
research budget.  The number also does not account for contracts that were never applied for in 
the first place.  Based on these data and individual testimonies about difficulties that universities 
all over the country are facing as a result of ITAR compliance, License Efficiency is another 
main area of concern for research universities. 
5.3 Collaboration 
Perhaps the most obvious and intentional consequence of the export control regulations as 
written is the inability of U.S. entities to interface with non-U.S. citizens on many technical 
projects, especially in the field of aerospace.  Though there exists some precedent for exceptions 
being made for foreign-U.S. dual citizens with minimum-security clearances in their other 
countries, in general a U.S. entity cannot transfer technical data about spacecraft technology 
development to a foreign national without a license to export.  Thus, when universities assemble 
research teams by hiring employees with relevant experience and skills or by forming 
collaborative agreements with other research institutions or agencies, they are limited in their 
choices of candidates.  Teams with diverse backgrounds that come from varied schools of 
thought enhance creativity in research, so the restriction on foreign collaborators ultimately hurts 
U.S. research opportunities.  As a result of the effects of ITAR, there are far fewer non-U.S. 
undergraduate and graduate students in aerospace programs than in other areas of study in the 
U.S., either because of limitations on their access to projects within the school or because they 
realize how difficult it is for non-Americans to find a job in aerospace upon graduating. [28]   
 
As a result of trying to hire the best academicians in their fields, universities often have a large 
number of non-U.S. faculty members.  In aerospace departments, hiring practices may be 
affected by the school’s stance on ITAR-restricted research.  In the case of sudden policy 
changes, professors can be evicted from their own projects.  Professor Thomas Zurbuchen at the 
University of Michigan had such an experience in 1999 (when satellite technologies were placed 
on the USML) when he, at the time a Swiss citizen, was isolated from the MESSENGER 
spacecraft’s Fast Imaging Plasma Spectrometer (FIPS) instrument project that he headed.  He 
was able to rejoin the project once he obtained his green card, but it was the first incident in a 
path that lead his lab to be a US-only environment with locked doors and computers to ensure 
ITAR compliance [29, 30].   
 
As previously mentioned, the fundamental research exemption does not hold if a project 
collaborator holds internal restrictions on its technologies, as it would violate the “public 
domain” aspect of the research.  Universities, especially those who maintain open research 
policies, would tend to avoid collaborating with companies who employ internal IP control as 
they would add license application cost and schedule to the collaborative project.  Collaboration 
is an essential part of the research university culture – it fosters new ideas and the sharing and 
distribution of resources and responsibilities.  As such, from the perspective of these 
organizations, export control policy should be reformed to optimize the potential for 
Collaboration. 
6. Policy Options and Analysis 
 
The preceding sections show that two of the primary stakeholders are not satisfied with the 
present U.S. Export Control Regime and that they broadly agree on the issues that should be 
addressed in future ITAR reform, including even the challenging balancing act between open 
markets and national security. Options for ITAR reform can include recommendations to 
improve stakeholder satisfaction by altering policy content or by improving the process by which 
it is implemented.  This section presents several options for how regulations and implementation 
could be changed to address shortfalls in the system. 
6.1 Export License Scope Trade Space 
The present ITAR framework is transaction-based.  First, the organization seeking a license must 
determine whether their proposed commodity transaction falls under ITAR jurisdiction (or 
submit a commodity jurisdiction request to DDTC).  For covered technologies, the State 
Department DDTC determines whether that commodity can be licensed to the proposed foreign 
entity.  This regulatory regime is inherently inflexible with respect to the covered technology and 
requires significant iteration: any change to a potential export during its design and development 
requires a new export license.  Because each case is assumed to be unique, there is limited 
opportunity for decisions to be covered by precedent; therefore, it is nearly impossible to quickly 
navigate the approval process.  Several changes to the individual transaction licensing system 
have been proposed.   
 
In order to provide a full description of the available options, we construct a trade space for an 
expanded scope licensing decisions in two axes, shown in Figure 3.  The two axes correspond to 
the two variables in an export license: the covered technology and the licensee. The first axis 
(horizontal) details the breadth and specificity of potential export control regulations, ranging 
from control of specific components to control at the subsystem or system level. The current 
export control regime, represented by the star in Figure 3, shows that current regulations apply at 
the specific component level.  
 
The second axis (vertical) is the specificity of the approved foreign transaction partner (licensee). 
Licenses can be granted to individuals, teams, agencies, nations, or groups of nations.  Moving 
from bottom to top of the vertical axis indicates progressively broader licensee scope.  The most 
expanded license may include export to all nations except states excluded due to embargo or 
other policy reasons, such as Cuba, China, and Iran. Currently, export control licenses are 
granted to end user organizations which are typically government agencies or commercial firms, 
but can sometimes include a wide range of end users within the authorized state. The gradients 
indicate tightness of security. Darker regions of the graph and axes denote more stringent 
regulations. In the white region of the graph, technologies are no longer regulated by the DoS 
and have instead been moved to DoC jurisdiction. 
 
Figure 3: Policy Trade Space 
 
Present licensing options can vary along the licensee axis but not greatly along the commodity 
axis.  For example, a specific commodity can be licensed for transfer or export to an individual, 
agency, or a community such as the UK government.  While some attempts have been made to 
broadly apply licenses to sets of technology, these are not actually as effective as intended, as 
discussed below.   
 
From this representation we can see several options for increasing flexibility in the export 
licensing system beyond the present restriction to case-by-case assessment of each 
technology.  The approximate scope of each option is identified by the dashed boxes in Figure 3. 
 
Region A: Reclassification and Deregulation – In this region of potential policy actions, the 
government removes items from ITAR jurisdiction.  This action may be undertaken for specific 
components or for components under a specific performance threshold [32].  This action requires 
the government to revise or add additional USML performance standards so that lower-
performing technology is moved to the CCL or is deregulated completely.  Congress must 
legislate this broader flexibility in commodity jurisdiction, because that status of satellite 
technology is currently hardcoded in legislation. 
 
Region B: Capability-Based Licensing – In this region, the government applies selective export 
control restrictions based on performance of covered systems.   A commodity is identified not by 
a specific description or part number but rather by the capability it delivers.  Granting a license 
under this scope would then apply to any other commodity of equal or lesser capability to the 
same licensee or wide set of licensees.  
  
Region C: Project-Specific Licensing – In this region, the government applies export licenses 
to all technology on an approved collaborative or international project. Here, the government 
chooses to trust a set of collaborators to protect the covered technology from further transfer and 
gives the responsible US entity exporter broad license to export any technology within the scope 
of the collaborative or international project. This process is similar to the process for contractor 
access to government classified information. 
 
Region D: Trusted Partner Export – In this region, the government grants an effective US 
person status for the purposes of ITAR export licensing for spacecraft commodities (category 
XV defense articles).  This can occur at any licensee level--from a bilateral agreement with a 
close ally to the certification of individuals or agencies as trusted collaborators.  In this region, 
instead of licensing specific technologies, people are licensed to work with or to receive the 
export of sensitive technologies instead. This allows people (or agencies) who work on many 
collaborative projects to receive blanket certifications and avoids the need to license every 
technology that they work with. One way this could be achieved using existing legal status 
designations is by granting US Person status to trusted individuals who are expected to 
collaborate frequently on ITAR-restricted projects. 
 
A step in this direction was implemented in 2012 with the US/UK Defense Trade Cooperation 
Treaty.  The treaty establishes a UK Community of trusted agencies and facilities for which 
license exemptions are automatically granted to the exporter.  However, the implementing 
agreement specifically excludes all USML Category XV items except for some XV(c) GPS 
commodities [33]. 
 
Region E: Abandon ITAR – This region represents the decision to remove all spacecraft 
technology entirely from the USML and to place it on the CCL or deregulate entirely.  While this 
option would alleviate the current confusion over which items do and do not require an export 
license and essentially eliminate the negative cost and schedule impacts that arise from the ITAR 
compliance process, it puts national security at an unacceptable level of risk. For this reason, this 
is not considered to be a viable future policy option.  
 
Star: Existing Licensing Process – This region represents the current export control regulations 
where the license process is limited to specific commodities and licenses have varying licensee 
scope.  At present, re-classifying spacecraft technology by executive agencies as dual-use CCL 
items is not possible because their classification as munitions is written into law by Congress. 
 The remainder of this section discusses specific policy recommendations that correspond to the 
depicted regions A-D above and also presents options for reforming ITAR’s implementation 
which can be applied to any region of the policy trade space.  
6.2 Re-classification and De-regulation  
The current export control regime controls all satellite technologies regardless of whether other 
countries have the capability to indigenously produce similar technologies or whether they are 
sufficiently diffused throughout the international marketplace. As a result, ITAR unnecessarily 
regulates technologies that are otherwise uncontrolled in the international manufacturer and 
customer community. A policy option that addresses this issue is to audit the USML to identify 
technologies that are not critical to national security due to their wide availability and either 
reclassify them as dual-use CCL commodities under the EAR or deregulate them entirely.  
 
One suggested method for auditing the USML is through a comparison of domestic and 
international satellite manufacturer capabilities. An example analysis is performed in Table 2, 
where the technical specifications of major U.S. satellite integrators are compared to those of 
their European competitors. Although the data shown in Table 2 is limited to that which is 
publicly available [34-43], it provides an illustration of how the USML could be audited. For 
example, from the technical specifications listed below, policymakers could recognize that the 
components and capabilities of the power subsystems are similar across integrators. If a more 
detailed comparison between U.S and internationally manufactured power subsystem 
components reveals that they are in fact equivalent, then these components can be removed from 
the USML. This type of side-by-side manufacturing capability analysis can be applied to all 
levels of a spacecraft’s architecture and could allow policymakers to remove items as small as a 
space-rated circuit and as large as an integrated satellite bus from the USML. Of course, in order 
to remove any technologies from the USML, it must be determined that such an action does not 
adversely impact national security. This disclaimer applies to all export reform suggestions 
throughout this paper, as we do not perform a comprehensive analysis of national security 
implications here. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Satellite Bus Definition  
 
 
A second suggested methodology for auditing the USML is by identifying and removing 
technologies that have sufficiently permeated the international marketplace. An example analysis 
is performed in Figure 4, where the payload frequency band for over 300 U.S. and internationally 
owned commercial communications satellites is shown [44-52]. The frequency-band in which 
each communications satellite operates determines the type of technology that is integrated into 
its payload. For example, if a satellite operates in the C-band, its solid-state amplifiers and 
transponders are unique to that bandwidth and cannot be integrated into a different satellite that 
intends to transmit in the Ka-band. Thus, if the U.S.’s commercial communications technology 
were unique, one would expect U.S.-satellites to be concentrated in an exclusive bandwidth. 
Figure 4 depicts the opposite: in the GEO COMSAT community, the use of each bandwidth (and 
its associated technology) is equally distributed between U.S. and commercial operators. From 
this information, policymakers might conclude that elements of the commercial communications 
payloads may be removed from the USML since they have sufficiently permeated the 
international marketplace. Like the manufacturing capability analysis discussed previously, this 
type of diffusion analysis can be performed at all levels of a spacecraft architecture and could 
allow policymakers to identify items that do not need to be protected by ITAR because they are 
commonly utilized by customers of all nationalities.  
 
 
Figure 4: International and U.S. Transponder Bands 
 
6.3 Capability-based Licensing 
The current export control regime requires that a license be granted for each technology export 
regardless of the type of technology or the recipient. In its licensing process, the DoS does not 
differentiate between allied countries, countries where technology exports are frequent, or 
technologies that are commonly approved for export. As a result, there is considerable 
duplication in the licensing process that adds unnecessary time and compliance measures into the 
current export control regime. A policy option that addresses these concerns would reform ITAR 
to allow open licensing of technologies that perform common functions at standard performance 
levels to particular countries and/or organizations within them. With this option, we suggest that 
ITAR be amended to allow the DoS to grant permanent export licenses of technologies that are 
commonly exported to countries that are either our allies or are our frequent customers. 
 
Statistics on the current population of satellites in Earth-orbit suggests that by applying open 
licenses to a specific set of countries, policymakers will still be able to positively impact 
interested stakeholders. Figure 5 depicts a breakdown of the countries that own satellites in 
geostationary orbit collected from the Union of Concerned Scientists website [53]. From this 
figure, we conclude that outside of the U.S. and China, only a handful of countries dominate the 
marketplace. Specifically, Canada, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Japan, Russia, and the United 
Kingdom own 22% of the current real-estate in GEO and another 13% (represented by 
“Multinational” in Figure 5) is owned by multiple European nations (typically ESA-members). 
From this and similar data on the current population of satellite technology in Earth-orbit, we 
suggest that policymakers can identify the countries that the U.S. frequently exports to and can 
reduce their licensing requirements in the future. 
 
 
Figure 5: Current Satellites in GEO: Country of Origin 
 
After specifying countries that are candidates for open licenses, policymakers can also specify 
the particular technologies to be covered by an open licensing regime. Given the industry-wide 
trend towards standardization, we suggest that policymakers identify technologies that have been 
standardized by U.S. manufacturers and that have equivalent forms on the international market 
and apply open licenses in these cases. Drawing from the data presented in Table 2, an example 
of a possible open export license would be the permanent licensing of Space Systems/Loral’s 
LS-1300 to customers in Luxembourg. 
6.4 Project-Specific Licensing  
Another potential reform would be the licensing of project-specific partnerships between U.S. 
and foreign collaborators, such that technology relating to a project can be shared freely between 
members of the project team without restriction or the need to apply for multiple licenses for 
technology transfer between the same parties.  An example of where this type of licensing is 
clearly valuable is the International Space Station, which is currently classified as dual-use.  If 
there is a crisis and real-time data needs to be shared between ISS partners, not having to worry 
about what data is able to be shared is critical to problem-solving.  Additionally, this reform 
option would especially benefit research and development collaborations such as exploration 
missions wherein the technology being transferred is not clearly defined and thus difficult to 
apply to license in a timely manner.  
 
Project-specific licensing for a large project like ISS could be implemented as a treaty, but not 
without changes in the implemented NDAA.  Precedent exists in other technology areas covered 
by defense cooperation agreements such as the Joint Strike Fighter cooperative development. 
Importantly, the export of specific technologies to collaborators in such an agreement is at the 
discretion of the US technical management, and the risk for unauthorized export is much higher 
than with micromanagement of licenses by the DDTC. 
6.5 Trusted Partner Export 
An extrapolation of Project-Specific Licensing is the licensing of foreign partners beyond 
specific projects to access, or be “cleared” for, ITAR-restricted information, specifically satellite-
related USML items.  These partners, be they nations, agencies, or just individuals, would be 
responsible for protecting this technology as an authorized end user from export to non-“trusted 
partners”.  This may require an added start-up cost and regulatory burden to track trusted 
individuals, but keeping in mind the duration of a career in aerospace, the costs of licensing 
individuals for all technology transfer compared to that of licensing individual technologies 
could balance out or even be lower.  In Sections 6.5.1 through 6.5.3, we will discuss suggested 
reforms and adaptations of precedent for each of partner nation, agency, and individual person 
licenses.     
6.5.1 Trusted Partner Nations 
Current US/UK and US/AUS Defense Trade Cooperation Treaties are much more limited in 
scope than they first appear, providing automatic exemptions only for specific certified end user 
agencies for end uses generally related to cooperative military development or combined 
operations, and furthermore excluding almost all satellite technology.  However, the process of 
negotiating cooperation treaties does create precedent for a much more expansive cooperation 
agreement. 
 
A more robust treaty could be implemented by marking all ITAR-restricted unclassified 
technology as releasable to the United Kingdom.  The UK and NATO already have a regulatory 
process for protecting national security information with a Restricted classification that has no 
direct analog in the US (it is applied to a variety of dissemination controls for unclassified 
information) but would effectively prevent re-export by a partner country.  Such a policy would 
greatly reduce the compliance burden on US exporters for sharing information with partners in 
the UK while trusting that the internal controls are sufficient to protect the sensitive ITAR 
information.  At the far end of cooperation on space technology, it would be possible to provide 
automatic exemptions to AUS, CAN, and the UK in order to eliminate the need for export 
licenses between these countries. 
6.5.2 Trusted Agencies 
National space or other government agencies often have a rigorous screening process for 
employees, so a reform more narrow in licensee scope would be to grant specific agencies of 
trusted nations licenses for access to USML spacecraft technology, such that any and all future 
partnerships are not limited by the need to apply for additional licenses.  Such an agreement 
would approve the end user agency for a wide scope of covered space technology exports.  This 
does not affect U.S. classified information, which would still be protected from release to anyone 
without appropriate clearance. 
 
The trusted agency option is a more realistic policy change because it directly leverages partner 
nation infrastructure in protecting sensitive technology with potential military applications.  For 
example, the Canadian Space Agency (CSA) could receive a wide-scope partner export license, 
allowing all CSA employees access to all USML spacecraft technology.  This would remove the 
need for individual license requests between the most trusted and frequent foreign partners, 
allowing direct collaboration with NASA and other US entity partners (excluding US classified 
information). 
6.5.3 Trusted Persons  
In addition to creating a new administrative system for granting broad access to ITAR 
commodities, many of the same effects could be achieved by expanding the pool of U.S. Person 
employees.  While changes to the visa and immigration policy regime may have unintended 
effects external to ITAR, specific limited reforms may be valuable.   
 
One potential reform that would allow employers to hire from a broader pool as well as 
encourage skilled technical students to stay in the US post-graduation is to speed up the process 
of or lower the price of employer sponsorship for US permanent residency (a “green card”) for 
students who earn technical doctorates from an ABET-accredited university in the U.S. The 
accreditation stipulation is in place to deter “diploma mills” from taking advantage of any 
provisions made for graduates of American higher education.  In 2009, 44.9% of aerospace 
engineering PhD recipients were foreign nationals, as were 20.8% of aerospace engineering 
masters recipients [54]. The U.S. has invested significantly in the training of these students, and 
it is in our best interest as a nation to retain their talent after they graduate, instead of making it 
incredibly difficult for them to stay and contribute to our economy. 
 
The progression of visas for foreign national students studying in the US is first an F1 visa 
during their studies, then an “Optional Practical Training” (OPT) visa for a maximum of 29 
months (12 months plus one-time 17 month extension for certain STEM degree recipients) that 
enables them to work in the U.S. during or after their studies in jobs directly related to their field 
of study. The F1 and the OPT are not “green card track”, or immigrant visas; in order for a 
foreign national graduate to continue working in the US beyond the extent of their OPT status, 
they must apply for and obtain an H-1B visa with the sponsorship of a U.S. employer.  After 
obtaining and spending at least a year on an H-1B visa, an employee can apply for a green card 
with the sponsorship of their employer.  Some foreign students are able to apply directly for an 
H-1B from an F1 if they find a willing sponsor during their studies to sponsor them upon 
graduation, but given the length of time for an H-1B application to be accepted, usually they 
must have an OPT visa in the interim.   
 
Sponsorship is expensive, both in application filing fees ($2000-2750 for H-1B, depending on 
size of company, with an additional $1225 for expedited processing [55] and at least $1485 for 
green card application, not including mandatory advertising for a position if applying for a green 
card though the labor certification process) and in legal fees to immigration lawyers ($4000 or 
more in legal costs per application for green card [56] and companies with many applications 
may retain a full-time attorney for that purpose). The availability of employers able to afford and 
willing to sponsor H-1B visas is thus understandably limited. 
 
There is a regular cap on the number of H1B visas per year (65,000) just as there are on green 
cards, but there is a separate Advanced Degree Exemption (ADE) cap of 20,000 beyond the 
regular cap that is limited to U.S. university graduates with a masters or higher degree, providing 
them an extra opportunity to get an H1B over other, non-advanced degree holders [57]. This 
gives some boost to the number foreign graduates of American universities who are able to stay 
in the US and work, but the process is still difficult, expensive, and time-consuming and there is 
no guarantee of permanent residency in a timely manner or at all.  There are multiple additional 
ways that the US could make the process of acquiring a green card simpler and thus entice and 
retain foreign graduates of American universities: 
1) Make it free for employers to sponsor employees with doctorates in technical fields for 
H-1B visas and/or green card applications (free or reduced price sponsorship) 
a) Employers would be more inclined to hire foreign nationals without the financial 
burden 
b) Foreign students would have easier time finding employment immediately post-
graduation, making them more likely to stay in the US 
2) Have PhD-holding employees go straight from OPT visa to green card track once hired 
(skipping 1+ year wait time on H-1B visa) 
3) Increase the ADE green card quota or implement a separate one just for PhD-holding 
applicants, with priority given within that group to PhDs from American universities, 
but include foreign PhDs as valid for quota too 
a) The National Foundation for American Policy (NFAP) has recommended 
exempting foreign graduates with an American university masters degree or higher 
from the employment-based green card quotas entirely.  Masters recipients are 
included within the NFAP recommendation because of the inclination of doctoral 
recipients to work predominantly in academia – masters-only recipients will infuse 
more broadly into the private sector.  Also, exempting masters students from the 
employment-based quota will remedy the backlog and long wait more than just 
exempting PhDs, since PhDs do not wait as long for a green card anyway under 
such provisions as the Outstanding Researcher (EB-1) category [54].  
b) Our recommendation is not to entirely do away with a quota, such as to not 
encourage engagement in higher education just for the sake of gaining U.S. 
residency.  Only requiring a masters degree for an employment-free green card, a 
degree often just two years in duration or effort, would make that potential 
motivation all the stronger and dilute the pool of graduate school applicants who 
are truly interested in a career in the field they are pursuing 
4) Make the F1 visa an immigrant visa, which would allow doctoral graduate students at 
US institutions to apply for a green card partway through their PhD, such that students 
can acquire permanent residency without needing to find a sponsor. 
 
6.6. Bureaucratic Process: Other Reform Options 
The License Scope Trade space is a useful representation for analyzing the potential changes to 
the export control policy, but it does not capture all policy reforms that could improve 
stakeholder satisfaction.  The model addresses the “what” of an export decision (and to some 
extent the “why”), but not the “who”, “where”, and “how” a decision is made. 
 
An important reform that is not represented by Figure 3 is the need to streamline and simplify the 
licensing process itself.  Several options are recommended: 
• The DoS and DoD could be realigned so that their actions with respect to export control 
are complementary and coherent.  
• The EAR and ITAR regulations could be combined and implemented by a single, 
streamlined commodity administration process. This would remove the need for 
exporters to make difficult commodity jurisdiction decisions with each export.  
• The export licensing process could be improved to make it more transparent and 
expedient. To do this, precedent could be more effectively used to make licensing 
decisions. 
• Finally, the process for obtaining license-approval could be improved by adding 
additional support staff with technical backgrounds to process license requests more 
efficiently.  
 
Because the above suggestions are process improvements, they can be applied both to the current 
export control regime and to the other options for export control that are represented in Figure 3. 
In the next section, we evaluate Figure 3’s policy options with respect to our pre-defined 
stakeholder metrics; however, we recommend that any new policy option be coupled with some 
or all of the process improvements suggested above. By coupling these process improvements 
with the options presented in Figure 3, policymakers have the greatest potential of increasing the 
degree to which Compliance Transparency and Licensing Efficiency increase.  
7. Policy Evaluation  
 
The policy prescriptions described in the previous section are designed to improve stakeholder 
satisfaction in one or more objectives.  This section will formally assess the effect that each of 
the policy options depicted in Figure 3 has on the set of metrics that were presented in Section 
3.   
 
Note that although we have identified Policy Transformability as a critical metric, we do not use 
it to evaluate the space of policy options discussed below. An assessment of Policy 
Transformability requires an analysis of the political and bureaucratic forces in place at the time 
of an attempted reform. These factors are both transient and highly complex and as a result, we 
exclude them from our present analysis but recognize their criticality in assessing a proposed 
policy’s potential for successful implementation.  
7.1 Metric Evaluation in Licensing Scope Trade space 
Using the license scope trade space, we can generalize how departures from the current limited-
scope export license process affect the stakeholder objectives.  Generally, increasing the 
potential scope of an export license decision to apply to a wider set of commodities or to a wider 
set of licensees improves the Collaboration, Market Flexibility, Transparency, and License 
Efficiency of the policy regime while decreasing the technology protection aspect of National 
Security to some extent. The trends are depicted in Figure 6 and discussed in detail below.  
 
 
Figure 6: Metric Trends across the ITAR Policy Trade Space 
 
Collaboration 
 Increasing the Commodity Scope of export control increases Collaboration because it 
increases the number and types of technology on which U.S. and international people or 
agencies can collaborate. By increasing the ability of the export control regime to 
discriminate between sensitive and non-sensitive technologies, reform options that 
increase the Commodity Scope open up more non-sensitive projects to potential 
international collaboration. 
 Increasing Licensee Scope increases Collaboration because it improves the ability of the 
regime to identify common collaborators and to grant them person or agency-specific 
licensee privileges. Essentially, these reforms reward successful past collaborations by 
granting collaborators continued licensing privileges that will incentivize them to 
continue working with U.S. organizations in the future.  
 
Market Flexibility  
 Increasing the Commodity Scope increases Market Flexibility because it reduces the 
number and types of technologies that are sheltered from market forces by removing 
export controls and releasing them into the international marketplace.  For example, using 
a capability threshold for licensing photovoltaic cells immediately opens competition for 
PV cell manufacturers below the performance threshold, allowing access to other 
potential system integrators.   
 Increasing the Licensee Scope generally increases Market Flexibility because it allows 
the U.S. to identify specific international organizations or countries that are preferred 
partners. By granting such these countries and organizations elevated status with respect 
to export controls, the proposed reforms make it easier for U.S. and international 
organizations to collaborate and to share project costs. The exception to this statement is 
with Project-Specific Licensing, which grants one-time licenses to specific projects but 
does not affect how the technologies on those projects are impacted by market forces in 
the future.  
 
Compliance Transparency  
 Increasing the Commodity Scope only secondarily impacts Compliance Transparency 
because these reforms will still require exporters to make commodity jurisdiction 
decisions. Within the current regime, there is often question on whether certain 
technologies are controlled by ITAR or not. If a broader set of technologies were covered 
by each export decision, a jurisdiction determination would still be needed for each one.  
The benefit comes from subsequent license decisions. 
 Increasing the Licensee Scope increases Compliance Transparency because it assigns 
exports licenses to specific people, groups, or countries. This removes the need to 
reassess each technology with each export and also eliminates confusion as to which 
technologies may be subject to ITAR jurisdiction by assigning easily identifiable agents 
export licenses instead.  
National Security 
 Increasing the Commodity Scope for de-regulation options has no impact on National 
Security because a prerequisite for removing technologies from the USML is an 
assessment that such an action will not adversely impact national security. However, 
granting export licenses for project-specific or unspecified technology export does 
increase the risk of unintended disclosure of protected technologies. 
 Increasing the Licensee Scope decreases National Security because it raises the status of 
foreign persons, organizations, or countries and trusts that they will protect sensitive U.S. 
technologies that the government has not licensed elsewhere.  
 
License Efficiency 
 Both increasing the Commodity Scope and increasing the Licensee Scope increase 
License Efficiency by reducing the number of licenses that need to be granted. This 
reduces the time it takes to grant licenses and thus lessens the cost to exporters awaiting 
license decisions.   
 As discussed in Section 6.6, process improvements will also increase License Efficiency, 
regardless of where the policy lies on the policy trade space.  
 
These generalized effects are not surprising, as we have already established that export control 
policy represents a balance between the benefits of sharing technology and the need to protect 
military technology advantages from potential rivals.   However, detailed analysis of the 
suggested reforms suggests several variations in the trend, where expected benefits may not be 
realized or harmful security impacts can be avoided; these impacts are summarized in Figure 7. 
 
 
Figure 7: Metric Evaluation of Main Policy Regions 
 
 
Since all of the proposed reforms A-D involve movement up or to the right on the scope trade 
space, we should expect to see improvements in each “openness” metric and a decrease in 
national security for each option.  As noted above, the exceptions are: 
• Limited adverse National Security impact from reclassification 
• Limited Compliance Transparency improvement from re-classification  
• Limited Market Flexibility improvement from project-specific licensing 
 
These exceptions, particularly the one related to National Security, make some options for ITAR 
reform more attractive than others. We use this analysis to motivate our final policy 
recommendation which is presented in the next section.  
8. Conclusion 
 
Our policy option trade space was constructed by reviewing the history of export control as 
applied to spacecraft, by identifying stakeholders and their values, and by focusing on the 
specific needs of two major stakeholder groups. By formulating policy-options in a trade space, 
we were able to present five different suggestions for export control, each of which contained a 
range of Licensee and Commodity Scopes, and evaluate them with respect to a set of defined 
metrics.  While all the potential policy modifications would help address the common reform 
goals shared between the stakeholders, the lowest risk and therefore easiest to implement reform 
option is to remove from ITAR protection those technologies whose disclosure no longer 
threatens national security. 
 
As identified in Section 7, the set of policy options contained in Region A positively impacted 
three stakeholder metrics without significantly negatively impacting national security. As 
emphasized throughout the paper, effective export control regimes are able to balance 
stakeholder and national security interests without negatively impacting either. Given this 
assessment, we suggest that law-makers consider reforming ITAR by auditing the USML and re-
classifying or de-regulating technologies based on the state-of-the-market evaluation presented in 
section 4.  Common COMSAT technologies could be moved to the CCL with no adverse impact 
and would go a long way toward addressing the concerns of both for-profit and non-profit US 
stakeholders.  For-profit developers would have access to world markets with greatly reduced 
administrative burden, and non-profit stakeholders could freely pursue collaborative activities 
related to de-regulated commercial spacecraft. 
 
Spacecraft technologies that are available on the international market should not require export 
protection under the ITAR.  The blanket protection placed on spacecraft technologies is an 
artifact of the long history of export control policy and the historical inseparability of space and 
defense technology.  The export control regime needs to be more responsive to the present 
security environment and rapidly evolving technology  
 
Although we make only one policy recommendation at this time, a key contribution of this paper 
is our formulation of the export control regime as a trade space of non-exclusive possible policy 
options. Using this formulation, lawmakers can identify more nuanced approaches to export 
control that, when assessed at a later date, may more effectively meet stakeholder needs than our 
current recommendation.  
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